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1 Introduction 
Turkey is under intense pressure from the International Financial Institutions or IFIs 
(mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) and from the 
European Commission to privatise and liberalise its electricity industry. The IFIs are 
making this a condition for their continued financial support for Turkey while 
complying with European Union (EU) law on electricity industries will be a condition 
for Turkey‘s entry to the EU. The objective of this paper will be to identify the 
consequences to date of the attempts to privatise and restructure the electricity 
industry. It will then examine the consequences of further attempts to privatise and 
liberalise the industry. Where the consequences might be adverse, the paper will try to 
identify strategies to mitigate them. 
In the second section of this paper, we present the current structure and characteristics 
of the Turkish electricity industry including: demand structure and recent growth 
trends; breakdown by generation sources; and corporate structure. We also identify 
the main priorities for the Turkish electricity sector that any reforms would be 
expected to address. 
In the third section we set out the form and rationale for the model of the electricity 
industry that the World Bank and the EU seek to impose. The model is based on the 
structure that the reforms to the British electricity industry of 1990 (the ‗British 
Model‘) was intended to achieve. 
In the fourth section we look at the policies that the IFIs have tried to impose on the 
electricity industries of recipient countries over the past two decades. We examine the 
specific conditions for granting loans that are currently being imposed on Turkey. We 
also explore the EU policy on electricity. We identify the requirements imposed on 
Member States by the Electricity Directives (EU laws) and assess their success in 
creating competition. In particular, we review investigations carried out in 2006 by 
the Commission‘s Directorate Generals on Energy and on Competition and the likely 
changes to EU law these will lead to. 
In the fifth section we consider experience of electricity reforms in Brazil and in the 
Nordic market, two systems where, as in Turkey, hydro-electric resources are a major 
factor. Brazilian experience is particularly relevant because the Brazilian government, 
under the instruction of the IFIs, embarked on a process of privatisation and 
liberalisation of electricity industries in 1995, which resulted in major electricity 
shortages in 2001. The Lula government has attempted to deal with this issue by 
abandoning the previous privatisation and liberalisation programme and renegotiating 
IFI public spending restrictions for investments in profitable infrastructure such as 
power industry assets. The Nordic market (covering Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark) is seen as one of the most successful attempts to liberalise electricity 
markets. This has been achieved while the industry is still dominated by publicly 
owned companies. However, like Brazil, investment in new generation has been 
minimal since liberalisation and this remains the major question-mark against the 
success of the reforms. 
In the sixth section we critically evaluate the ‗British‘ model in particular its 
suitability for Turkey. We assess the various proposals that have been put forward for 
the Turkish electricity sector. We also identify policies Turkey might follow to 
mitigate any adverse effects. 
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2 The Turkish electricity industry 
2.1 Supply and demand trends 
Table 1 Electricity demand and supply - 1970-2006 
Year Installed capacity MW Consumption TWh 
1970 2235 8.6 
1975 4187 15.7 
1980 5119 24.6 
1985 9119 36.4 
1990 16315 56.8 
1995 20952 85.6 
2000 27264 128.3 
2005 38819 160.8 
2006 40539 174.2 
Source: Basaran M (2007) ‗Turkey: Moving towards the liberalisation in the electricity sector‘ 
Presentation to International Gas Congress 2007, April 30, 2007. 
Table 1 shows the remarkable growth in electricity demand in Turkey since 1970, 
demand growing on average by more than 8% per annum with little sign of the 
saturation of demand that is evident in Northern European countries. 
Table 2 Generation by energy source – 1985-2006 (GWh) 
Year Coal & 
lignite 
Oil Natural 
Gas 
Renewable 
& waste 
Hydro Geothermal 
& wind 
Total 
1985 15207.8 7082.0 58.2 0.0 12044.9 6.0 34218.9 
1990 20181.3 3941.7 10192.3 0.0 23147.6 80.1 57543.0 
1995 28046.9 5772.0 16579.3 222.3 35540.9 86.0 86247.4 
2000 38186.3 9310.8 46216.9 220.2 30878.5 108.9 124921.6 
2001 38417.5 10366.2 49549.2 229.9 24009.9 152.0 122724.7 
2002 32149.1 10743.8 52496.5 173.7 33683.8 152.6 129399.5 
2003 32252.9 9196.2 63536.0 115.9 35329.5 150.0 140580.5 
2004 34447.6 7670.3 62241.8 104.0 46083.7 150.9 150698.3 
2005 43192.5 5482.5 73444.9 122.4 39560.5 153.4 161956.2 
2006 46307.1 7697.5 77386.9 120.6 44157.7 223.5 175893.3 
 
Source: TEIAS, Electricity Statistics 
Note: 2006 figures are provisional  
Table 2 shows the basic changes in the supply sources of the Turkish electricity 
generation in recent years. The main change is a shift to imported sources, particularly 
to gas (in 1990 17.7% of generation, in 2005 43.8%). There has also been a switch 
from locally produced lignite to imported coal. 
The dependency on imported resources increased the share of energy in total imports 
from 9.8% in 1998 to 20% in 2005. This has had significant consequences as Turkey 
has a large balance of payments deficit and can only borrow by offering high interest 
rates. The dependency on foreign resources for energy increases Turkey‘s overall 
dependency on foreign capital and thus to IFI‘s. 
The hydraulic contribution is variable partly due to weather conditions. How far 
weather conditions accounted for the decline in hydraulic generation in 2001 
compared to 2000 and 1995 is not clear. GNP decreased in 1999 and 2001 with a 
consequent decrease in demand for electricity leading to excess generating capacity. 
The government was under an obligation to buy electricity produced by independent 
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power producers or IPPs (see below), and it may have been necessary to reduce the 
publicly owned hydraulic generation to make space for this take-or-pay power. 
Table 3 shows that trade in electricity accounts for only a very small proportion of 
overall supply. Network losses have declined from about 20% to 15%, but remain 
high by international standards. 
Table 3 Capacity, production and consumption of electricity 
 2000 2004 2005 2006 
Installed capacity (MW) 27264 36824 38843 40539 
Gross production (GWh) 124922 150698 161956 175893 
Net production (GWh) 118698 145066 155469 168872 
Import (GWh) 3791 463 63 573 
Export (GWh) 437 1144 1798 2236 
Network losses 23756 23243 24044 26109 
Net consumption 98296 121142 130263 141100 
Source: ‗Turkey‘s statistical yearbook, 2005‘ http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/yillik.pdf and TEIAS 
for 2005 and 2006 data 
Table 4 shows that demand is concentrated in the West and South, with four of the 12 
Statistical Regions, SRE, (Istanbul, Aegean, Mediterranean and East Marmara) 
accounting for nearly two thirds of demand. These regions are also the largest 
consumers on a per capita basis. For example, people in the East Marmara region 
consume about six times as much electricity per capita as some of the Eastern regions. 
Table 4 Electricity demand by region (2004)  
Region Demand 
GWh (%) 
2000 Population 
(thousand) 
Demand per 
capita 
Istanbul 20648 (17) 10019 2061 
West Marmara 8901 (7) 2896 3073 
Aegean 20090 (17) 8939 2247 
East Marmara 21000 (17) 5741 3658 
West Anatolia 10131 (8) 6443 1572 
Mediterranean 15043 (12) 8706 1728 
Central Anatolia 4672 (4) 4189 1115 
West Black Sea 6145 (5) 4896 1255 
East Black Sea 2139 (2) 3132 683 
North East Anatolia 1332 (1) 2508 531 
Central East Anatolia 2349 (2) 3727 630 
South East Anatolia 7521 (6) 6608 1138 
Total 121141 67804 1787 
Source: ‗Turkey‘s statistical yearbook, 2005‘ http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/yillik.pdf  
In terms of demand by application, industry dominates, more than half of Turkey‘s 
electricity going to industry and about a quarter going to households (see Table 5). 
There was relatively little change in this breakdown in the period 2000 to 2004. 
Within industry, no sector dominates and, again, there was relatively little change in 
the composition of demand between sectors from 2000 to 2004 (see Table 6). 
2.2 New entrants 
From 1970-94, Turkish electricity industry was concentrated in a single, nationally-
owned company, the Turkish Electricity Authority (TEK). This company had a 
statutory monopoly until 1984. Since then, there have been various measures to 
encourage independent power producers (IPPs) to enter the market. 
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Table 5 Demand by sector (2004) 
   GWh (%) 
Sector 2000 2004 2005 
Industrial and others 50090 (51) 61845 (51) 62294 (48) 
Public admin & public utilities 9329 (9) 10279 (8) 4663 (4) 
Commerce, services & handicraft 8064 (8) 14215 (12) 18454 (14) 
Public illumination 4217 (4) 4387 (4) 4143 (3) 
Household 23888 (24) 27619 (23) 30395 (23) 
Others 2094 (2) 2365 (2) 9684 (7) 
Total 98296 121142 130263 
Source: ‗Turkey‘s statistical yearbook, 2005‘ http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/yillik.pdf and TEDAS 
for 2005 data. 
Table 6 Demand by industrial sector (2004) 
   GWh (%) 
Sector 2000 2004 2005 
Agriculture, forestry etc 3070 (6) 3895 (6) 4143 (6) 
Coal & lignite mining 542 (1) 453 (1) 1067 (2) 
Food, beverage & tobacco 3091 (6) 3485 (6) 3754 (6) 
Textiles, leather & clothing 9059 (18) 11186 (18) 12100 (19) 
Wood, paper & allied 2356 (5) 2055 (3) 2373 (4) 
Rubber & plastic 1708 (3) 1604 (3) 1525 (2) 
Chemicals 4673 (9) 5303 (9) 4913 (8) 
Earthenware & cement 6873 (14) 6407 (10) 6537 (10) 
Iron & steel 8395 (17) 10939 (18) 11661 (18) 
Non-ferrous metal 2514 (5) 2699 (4) 2485 (4) 
Electric machinery & transport equipment 2483 (5) 2418 (4) 2489 (4) 
Other manufacturing 5326 (11) 11401 (18) 12127 (19) 
Total 50090 61845 65173 
Source: ‗Turkey‘s statistical yearbook, 2005‘ http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/yillik.pdf and TEDAS 
for 2005 data 
2.2.1 TOR plants 
A law was passed in 1984 (no. 3096) introducing Transfer of Operating Rights (TOR) 
under which state-owned power plants could be transferred for a fee to the private 
sector for 20 years with an annual fixed price payment, but power purchase 
guarantees. In fact, only two plants have been transferred (see Table 7), a 620 MW 
coal plant (Çayirhan) and a small hydro plant (Hazar, 30MW). 
2.2.2 BOT plants 
This was followed in 1994 by a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law (no 3996). The 
BOT plants were built with an operation period before transfer of up to 99 years, but 
usually 20-30 years, after which the plants were transferred to the Ministry of Energy 
& Natural Resources (MENR). The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) allowed fixed 
prices for each year and a 100% purchase guarantee. By 2007, a total of 2449MW (25 
plants) of BOT plants were in operation made up of 1450MW of combined cycle gas 
turbine (CCGT), 982MW of hydro and 17MW of wind (see Table 7). 
2.2.3 BOO plants 
In 1997, a further law (4283) allowing Build-Own-Operate (BOO) plant was passed. 
This resulted in 6102MW of capacity being built of which 4782MW was combined 
cycle gas (four stations) and the rest was accounted for by a single 1320MW coal 
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plant (see Table 7). These plants introduced a little more risk for the developers. The 
size, type and location of projects were specified and the contract was awarded on the 
basis of the lowest electricity price. Power purchase contracts of 20 years, including 
the construction period, are awarded and there is an 85% purchase guarantee. 
These plants brought in foreign investors, notably Intergen, a joint venture company 
formed in 1995 by Bechtel and Shell, STEAG and Enron. The three plants built by 
Intergen (90%) and Enka (10%) sold their output to TEAS and purchased their gas 
from BOTAS. However, in 2005, Intergen was broken up and its shares in the Turkish 
plants were sold to its Turkish partner Enka. 
The Enron plant, Trakya, was included with Enron‘s other non-US assets in a 
company called Prisma in the restructuring that followed Enron‘s collapse in 2001. 
Prisma was bought by a subsidiary of a UK private equity investor, Ashmore Energy 
International (AEI). 
The Iskenderun coal-fired plant was built by a consortium of two German companies, 
STEAG and RWE and a Turkish company, OYAK, but in 2004, RWE sold its 25% 
stake to OYAK giving OYAK a stake of 49%. 
Table 7 TOR, BOO and BOT plant 
Power plant Type Capacity (MW) Company Arrangement 
Çayirhan Coal 620 Park Termik TOR 
Hazar Hydro 30 Bilgin Elektrik TOR 
TOR  650   
Esenyurt CCGT 188 Doğa Enerji BOT 
Ova CCGT 258 Ova Elektrik BOT 
Trakya CCGT 499 Enron BOT 
Uni-Mar CCGT 504 Uni-Mar BOT 
Birecik Hydro 672 GAMA BOT 
Yamula Hydro 100 Ayen Enerji BOT 
Çamlica-1 Hydro 84 GAMA BOT 
Small hydro (<30MW) Hydro 126  BOT 
Wind Wind 17  BOT 
BOT  2448   
Adapazari CCGT 798 Intergen, Enka BOO 
Gebze CCGT 1595 Intergen, Enka BOO 
Izmir CCGT 1591 Intergen, Enka BOO 
Ankara CCGT 798 Suez, Minag BOO 
Ìskenderun Coal 1320 Steag, RWE, OYAK BOO 
BOO  6102   
Source: Basaran M (2007) ‗Turkey: Moving towards the liberalisation in the electricity sector‘ 
Presentation to International Gas Congress 2007, April 30, 2007. 
The BOT and the BOO projects proved expensive and by 2003 there were reports that 
the government would cancel the PPAs for the Trakya, Uni-Mar, Esenyurt and Ova 
gas-fired plants, as well as six hydro projects including the Birecik and Camlica 
plants. There were also reports that a State Inspection Board report had shown up 
irregularities and over-pricing. In the event, the contracts were not cancelled. 
2.2.4 The overall generation market 
Table 8 shows that the generation market is dominated by the public producer, EÜAS, 
although the PPAs that the BOT/BOO plants have mean that they take a much higher 
share of generation than of capacity. There is a total of 4100MW of autoproducer 
capacity using various fuels. 
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Table 8 Market shares of generators 
    2000     2006 
 Share of 
capacity 
Share of 
generation 
Share of 
capacity 
Share of 
generation 
EÜAS 78 75 58 46 
Autoproducers 11 13 10 9 
BOO/BOT  7 10 21 33 
TOR 1 1 2 2 
Concession companies 2 2 0 0 
Free gen companies 0 0 7 7 
Source: Basaran M (2007) ‗Turkey: Moving towards the liberalisation in the electricity sector‘ 
Presentation to International Gas Congress 2007, April 30, 2007. 
2.3 The state-owned companies 
 In 1994, TEK was split into a generation and transmission company, TEAS, and a 
distribution company, TEDAS. In 2001, TEAS was further split into a generation 
company, EÜAS, a trading and contracting company, TETAS and a transmission 
company, TEIAS. All four companies remain fully nationally-owned. 
Table 9 Main thermal power plants operated by EÜAS 
Plant Capacity (MW) Fuel 
Afsin Elbistan A 1355 Lignite 
Afsin Elbistan B 1440 Lignite 
Seyitomer 600 Coal 
Kangal 457 Lignite 
Tuncbilek 365 Lignite 
Catalagzi 300 Coal 
Orhaneli 210 Coal 
18 Mart Can 320  
Bursa 1432 Gas 
Ambarli 1351 Gas 
Ambarli 630 Fuel oil 
Hamitabat 1120 Gas 
Soma A-B 1034 Lignite 
Yatagan 630 Lignite 
Yenikoy 420 Lignite 
Kemerkoy 630 Lignite 
Source: Basaran M (2007) ‗Turkey: Moving towards the liberalisation in the electricity sector‘ 
Presentation to International Gas Congress 2007, April 30, 2007. 
Notes 
1. Includes plants larger than 200MW. 
2. The Hamitabat, Soma A-B, Yataga, Yenikoy and Kemerkoy plants were transferred to the 
government Privatisation Authority in preparation to be sold. 
2.3.1 EÜAS 
EÜAS is the operator of the state-owned plants (see Tables 9 and 10) with a total of 
23714MW of plants, including 18 thermal plants (12554MW) and 110 hydro plants 
(11159MW). Six of its thermal plants were transferred to the government‘s 
privatisation authority in 2002 in preparation for sale, but they remain in government 
hands, operated by EÜAS. 
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The latest plan (May 2007) for privatisation of generation is that some of the larger 
hydroelectric plants will remain in EÜAS. The remaining hydro and all the thermal 
plants will be divided into six groups and a consultant to oversee privatisation will be 
selected at the end of 2007. Bidding for the companies is expected to start in 2008. 
Whether this timetable is any more realistic than earlier plans remains to be seen. 
Table 10 Main hydraulic dams operated by EÜAS 
Plant Capacity (MW) 
Altinkaya 703 
Aslantas 138 
Ataturk 2405 
Batman 198 
Berke 510 
Borcka 300 
Catalan 169 
Dicle 110 
Gezende 159 
Gokcekaya 278 
Hasan Ugurlu 500 
Hirfanli 128 
Karakaya 1800 
Karkamis 189 
Keban 1330 
Kilickaya 120 
Menzelet 124 
Muratli 115 
Ozluce 170 
Sariyar 160 
Sir 283 
Source: Basaran M (2007) ‗Turkey: Moving towards the liberalisation in the electricity sector‘ 
Presentation to International Gas Congress 2007, April 30, 2007. 
Notes 
1. Includes plants larger than 100MW. 
Table 11 International interconnections 
Turkish substation Connection to Capacity (MVA) 
Babaeski Bulgaria 1000 
Hamitabat Bulgaria 1500 
Hopa Georgia 300 
Kars Armenia 300 
Silopi Iraq 500 
Igdir Azerbaijan 100 
Dogubeyazit Iran 100 
Baskale Iran 1500 
Birecik Syria 1000 
Source: Basaran M (2007) ‗Turkey: Moving towards the liberalisation in the electricity sector‘ 
Presentation to International Gas Congress 2007, April 30, 2007. 
2.3.2 TEIAS 
TEIAS operates and maintains the transmission system, carries out dispatching, 
balancing and settlement, and makes forecasts of capacity and demand. It also 
operates the international connections, which exist for all neighbouring countries 
except Greece (see Table 11). A connection to Greece with a capacity of 400kV is 
expected to be completed in 2008. This will form part of an ambitious plan to 
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interconnect all the countries of the Mediterranean (France, Spain, Morocco, Algeria, 
Turkey, Greece, Italy, Libya, Egypt and Jordan) through the ‗Medring‘. The 
connection with Greece will mean the Turkish grid will be synchronised to the 
Western European UCTE grid. 
2.3.3 TETAS 
TETAS purchases power from EÜAS‘s power plants and from the BOT, BOO and 
TOR plants, selling the output to the distribution companies. 
2.3.4 TEDAS 
TEDAS has been divided into 21 distribution companies in preparation for 
privatisation. The distribution companies are planned to be the first part of the 
electricity sector to be privatised. Some of the areas, particularly where demand is 
high and the population is concentrated might attract interest from private buyers, but 
other areas, requiring substantial investment to strengthen the network will be less 
attractive. In addition, if Turkey does join the EU, these distribution companies may 
have to be further sub-divided into monopoly distribution and competitive retail 
companies. This will make the outlook for buyers even more uncertain. 
Targets for privatising these companies have been consistently missed since 1997 and 
all remain within TEDAS. Most recently, PA Consulting was selected in August 2004 
to give advice on the privatisation of the distribution sector with a view to privatising 
some of the companies by the end of June 2006. The bidding process was started for 
three distribution companies including Istanbul, but abandoned in December 2006 
until after the Turkish general elections of 2007. A total of 37 companies had applied 
to pre-qualify to bid for the companies. Amongst the main expected bidders were: 
EnBW, an integrated electricity company based in Germany but controlled by the 
French company, EDF; ENEL (Italy); Iberdrola (Spain); Endesa (Spain), Siemens 
(Germany), RWE (Germany) E.ON (Germany); AES (USA) and Tractebel/Suez 
(France). ENEL had set up a joint venture with a Turkish construction firm, Enka, 
which already had interests in generation through its partnership with Intergen for its 
BOO plants. 
2.3.1. and 2.3.4 may be expanded with more information on the reasons why the 
privatisation targets both for generation and distribution unit were ―missed‖. This part 
then shall connect to 2.2. 
2.4 Regulation 
The Electricity Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) was set up 2001 under the 
terms of the Electricity Market Law (no 4628). It subsequently became the Energy 
Market Regulatory Authority when the natural gas (2001) petroleum (2003) and LPG 
markets (2005) came under its jurisdiction. Decisions are taken by a nine-person 
board comprising a president and eight members. Its main duties are to: issue licenses; 
monitor and supervise the market; approve, amend and enforce performance 
standards; set pricing principles and regulations for tariffs; and settle disputes. 
2.5 Competition 
There is no formal wholesale market with most wholesale power being bought by 
TEIAS, although bilateral contracts are allowed. However, under the Electricity 
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Market Law, no generation company can have more than 20% of the market and no 
wholesaler can have a market share greater than 10%. Autoproducers can sell no more 
than 20% of their output to the market unless they have a generation license. 
Retail competition was introduced following the passing of the Electricity Market 
Law (no 4628) in 2001. Consumers directly connected to the transmission network 
(electric intensive industry) and consumers using more than 9GWh per year were no 
longer required to buy from the incumbent retailer. In January 2004, the limit was 
reduced to 7.8TWh, in January 2005 to 6GWh and January 2007, to 3GWh. EMRA 
expects these limits to be further reduced. 
2.6 Priorities for the Turkish electricity sector 
Today for many the number one priority for the Turkish electricity sector is concern 
about security of supply. It is now a common perception that if there are no new 
investments, Turkey will suffer from electricity shortages in a few years. As well as 
the need for additional capacity there is also a specific shortage of peaking capacity. 
Critics of the privatisation/liberalisation policy point to this potential shortage as 
evidence of the failure of this policy. 
However, some of the defenders of privatisation also base their agenda on the supply 
gap being a priority in the sector. Privatisation has always been presented as the only 
way to ensure new investment. It was argued that the government and government-
owned companies could not be relied upon undertake this investment because of the 
budget deficit and shortage of funds. Neo-liberals also argued that due to the 
inefficiency of public administration the high percentage of losses and theft could not 
be prevented while the sector was in public ownership. With privatisation there would 
be more investment and better management and the danger of electricity shortage 
would be prevented. The alleged greater efficiency of the private sector compared to 
the public sector and the benefits of competition over monopoly were not the primary 
justifications but were seen as supporting arguments.  
Some of the protagonists of liberalisation have a different concept of the priorities for 
the sector stressing much more the pursuit of a ‗perfect‘ market. Atiyas (2006) argues 
that: ―In the short term two important objectives can be underlined. The first 
implementing steps that can start operationalizing the envisaged market model. The 
second is to restructure the policy making and regulatory process itself so as to make 
it more transparent and accountable.‖ They critise revenue oriented privatisation and 
policies to render assets more attractive to potential buyers (especially by vesting 
them with monopoly rights), argue that liberalisation of generation through (public) 
portfolio generation companies is possible and criticize the elimination of limitations 
on vertical integration. They are also suspicious of the AKP government and the 
Ministry and think that with their revenue oriented and populist policies the market is 
further distorted.  
For the supply gap they say: ―One way to encourage investments in the medium term 
is to reduce regulatory uncertainty and enhance credibility of the regulatory 
framework. Care needs to be taken to ensure that any additional emergency measures 
that may be adopted in the short term are not inconsistent with the model adopted by 
the EML and does not further delay its implementation.‖ (Atiyas 2006) (See also 
Sevaioglu).  
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3 The British Model 
Electricity industries were aiming to replicate the model that the 1990 changes to the 
UK electricity industry were meant to accomplish, which, themselves, drew on 
experience in Chile in the early 1980s. The fundamental objective is, wherever 
possible, to replace (public) monopoly with (private) competition. To achieve this, the 
sector is divided into four separate activities: 
 Wholesale: Electricity generation; 
 Retail: Retail to final consumers; 
 Transmission: The national (or regional) transmission networks that takes 
electricity at high voltage from point of production to centres of demand; and 
 Distribution: The local distribution networks that take electricity from the 
transmission networks to final consumers. 
According to theory, the rationale for this separation is that wholesale and retail can 
be made ‗competitive‘ with prices set by markets. It is assumed that sectors run on 
competitive lines are invariably more efficient than those run as monopolies and as a 
result, consumers will benefit through lower prices. Transmission and distribution are 
natural monopolies and prices will be set by an independent regulator. 
The most important element of the model is the creation of a wholesale market as this 
is the largest element of an electricity bill, typically making up more than 50% of the 
overall charge for electricity. Reductions in the cost of generation can make a 
significant difference to consumers‘ bills. Transmission (5-10%) and distribution (25-
35%) remain regulated monopolies so re-organisation here would not make a 
significant difference to their cost. Retail is only about 5% of the cost to consumers, 
so retail competition should not, in theory, be able to make much impact on overall 
prices unless the wholesale market was so imperfect that some retailers are able to 
buy much more cheaply from the wholesale market than others. A wholesale market 
with such serious flaws is unlikely to be efficient. 
For this model to work, the following conditions are generally seen as necessary: 
 An hourly or half hourly wholesale market should exist buying and selling 
electricity and would provide reliable price signals for purchases made outside 
this market and for investment decisions in new generating capacity; 
 A retail market should exist, in which all consumers are able to switch readily 
between retailers. This would place competitive pressure on suppliers to 
purchase wholesale power as cheaply as possible and inefficient or high-priced 
suppliers would be squeezed out of the market; 
 Access to the networks should be available to all wholesalers and retailers on 
equal terms. This would require some form of ‗unbundling‘ of the network 
businesses from the retail and wholesale businesses; and 
 A regulatory body should exist to ensure that competition is fair, access to 
networks is impartial, competitive fields of companies exist in both wholesale 
and retail activities, and consumers are protected from exploitation by 
companies. 
One policy measure adopted by some countries was to unbundle or separate 
generation and retail. This would appear to be a necessary step if wholesale markets 
are to be ‗liquid‘, in other words, a significant proportion of sales pass through the 
market. If the market is dominated by integrated generator/retailers, there will be no 
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‗liquidity‘ in the wholesale markets and the main justification for the changes will be 
lost because price signals will not be reliable enough for buyers and sellers to trust. As 
a result, in some countries that followed the British model, such as Brazil and 
Colombia, integration of generation and retail was made illegal. 
However, integration of generation and retail is highly desirable, and probably 
necessary for generation companies because it means that, instead of selling their 
power into an unpredictable wholesale market where they cannot know from one 30-
minute period to the next how much power they will sell and at what price, if they 
integrate generation and retail, they sell directly to final consumers with price and 
volumes that are much more predictable. 
In the Chilean and British electricity models, a key goal was to change from national 
public ownership to private. For some organisations promoting changes to the 
electricity sector, such as the World Bank, privatisation is still the main objective and 
the introduction of competition is a much lower priority. However, the European 
Union (EU) has no jurisdiction over ownership of member states‘ industries so change 
of ownership is not, and cannot be, any part of the EU‘s attempts, through its 
Electricity Directives, to create a single European market in electricity. But it is 
forcing open markets, meaning that private owners must be allowed into the sector. 
The Scandinavian countries of Norway, Finland and Sweden did open their markets 
with some success, but the industry remains mainly in public hands, much of it owned 
by local authorities, and change of ownership has not been part of the changes. 
An important difference between the World Bank and the Commission is that the 
World Bank‘s priority appears to be privatisation. Under World Bank inspired 
reforms, unbundling is usually carried out but the competitive elements of the model 
are seldom enforced and wholesale and retail competition is illusory. The EU has no 
jurisdiction over ownership and while the consequence of its policies is often 
privatisation, the EU has no power to require Member States to sell its assets. 
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4 The World Bank and the EU policies on electricity 
4.1 The World Bank 
4.1.1 Policies towards the electricity sector 
The World Bank has a poor record on the policies it enforces in the electricity sector. 
By the mid-to late-1980s, the World Bank had become impatient at what it perceived 
as the failure of its loans to bring about efficiency improvements in publicly-owned 
electric utilities. It saw corruption and inefficiency in these companies as barriers. As 
a result, it began to promote the use of Independent Power Producers (IPPs), giving 
loans for new entrants, often foreign companies, to build plants that would be given 
long-term PPAs to supply the incumbent utility. 
IPPs were seen as having several advantages. They were thought to overcome the 
problems of corruption and it was expected that the international companies would be 
more efficient than the local companies. Ideally, the plant builder would be selected 
on the basis of a competitive bidding process with the contract awarded to the 
company that would provide the cheapest power. How far the World Bank had a tacit 
policy against public ownership is hard to tell, but there is little evidence of them 
trying to nurture publicly owned companies in recent years. 
For some governments, IPPs were also often attractive. They seemed to relieve the 
government of the responsibility of managing national companies and reduced the 
burden on public spending. However, the disadvantages rapidly became apparent. 
To protect the profits of the investing companies, financiers required that PPAs were 
usually denominated in US dollars and were given long-term take-or-pay contracts at 
pre-determined prices. If the value of local currencies declined and demand did not 
grow as rapidly as expected, the profits of the investor were fully protected. So while 
the investors bore some of the technical risk, for example, if construction costs or time 
overran, they would bear the cost, they took no commercial risk. 
The East Asian currency crisis of 1997 brought home the extent of these problems. 
Bayliss and Hall (2000) clearly identify the main problems with IPPs. Local utilities 
were often nearly bankrupted paying for expensive power they did not need. The 
World Bank (Albouy & Bousba) was forced to acknowledge some of these problems. 
Albouy and Bousba (1998) found that seven countries accounted for 87% of 
investment in IPPs. These were China (32%), Indonesia (14%), Philippines (10%), 
India (8%), Pakistan (7%), Malaysia (7%), Turkey (5%) and Thailand (4%). The 
World Bank is forced to acknowledge that IPPS have been more problematic than 
expected. Albouy and Bousba (1998) ask four questions: 
 ‗Has risk been transferred to the private sector?‘ It found: ‗On balance, IPPs make a 
significant difference in many countries by covering construction, operating, and fuel 
availability risks; less so in the few cases where state-owned utilities have a good 
track record, as in Thailand, or have already transferred construction and operating 
risks through turnkey procurement and leases or through concession contracts.‘ 
 ‗Have IPPs contributed to an increase in foreign exchange exposure?‘ It found ‗In 
general, the sector‘s exposure to foreign exchange risks has stayed the same or 
increased with IPPs. But in a few countries the power sector‘s foreign exposure is 
likely to be higher with IPPs than under expansion plans cantered on state-owned 
utilities. That exposure can be risky if the IPP program is large, as is the case in 
Pakistan.‘ 
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 ‗Are pricing and investment decisions efficient?‘ It found: ‗In the final analysis it 
appears that IPPs have often inflated supply prices for utilities. In the Philippines the 
average generating cost for IPPs in 1996 was US$76 per MWh, compared with 
US$57 for the state-owned utility.‘ 
 Have IPPs contributed to sector modernization?‘ It found: ‗In the long run PPA prices 
and contractual rigidities may prove costly whenever IPPs lose competitiveness 
following technical progress and access to cheap gas or hydro. The resulting stranded 
assets may complicate unbundling and reduce revenues from privatization unless 
these obstacles are removed in due course, as they were in the United States. The 
main challenge is in Asia, the host of most IPPs, where sector reforms have yet to be 
made. 
IPPs did not even efficiently deal with capacity problems. Albouy and Bousba found: 
‗But too much was signed too soon in at least three countries, with the result that some 
IPPs did not reduce outages and merely inflated reserve margins.‘ 
Independent commentators and other bank staff were more scathing. Alexander‘s Gas 
& Oil Connections reported
1
 
‗For the last decade, the World Bank has encouraged independent power producer deals 
between its client-utilities and private investors and, in so doing, has generated far more 
political and economic chaos than cheap kW for consumers. Even the World Bank's 
energy experts now admit that independent power producer, or IPP, contracts -- whereby 
governments offer guaranteed revenues to private investors to build power plants and sell 
their output to a state-owned monopoly -- were designed to protect private investors at 
public expense. According to World Bank energy specialist Laszlo Lovei, IPP deals have 
not only imposed huge liabilities on governments, they have invited corruption wherever 
they were tried in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe.‘ 
However, by then, the World Bank already had a new policy that it portrayed as the 
‗first best solution‘2 Since the mid-90s, its policy has been privatisation and imposing 
the British Model. As with the IPP policy, this was based on an assumption that 
private sector companies would invariably be more efficient than local nationally 
owned companies, that there would be less scope for local corruption and that foreign 
companies would be more likely to be able to meet the investment needs.  
There was little if any evidence to back up these assertions. At least in the electricity 
sector, a thorough independent study found no evidence that private owners were 
more efficient than public
3
. The private sector had already shown itself liable to 
corruption and investment was dependent, not on need, but on the extent of the 
financial ‗carrots‘ that were available. 
However, what gave the World Bank‘s new policy a ‗fig-leaf‘ of intellectual 
respectability was the promise of market discipline. The British Model was then 
widely perceived to have been a success in Britain despite the fact that any 
independent analysis of the operation of the model would have shown that in all 
important respects, the model was unproven (Surrey, 1996). All that could be 
reasonably claimed by 1994, when the World Bank began to promote the British 
Model was that it had not led to a catastrophic failure in the UK. Despite this, the 
                                                 
1 Alexander‘s Gas & Oil Connections, vol 7 issue 12, June 13, 2002 
2 See, for example, Albouy Y & Bousba R (1998) ‗The Impact of IPPs in Developing Countries—Out 
of the Crisis and into the Future‘ Public policy for the private sector, note no 162, World Bank, 
Washington. http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PublicPolicyJournal/162albou.pdf  
3 Pollitt, M., (1995) ‗Ownership and Performance in Electric Utilities.‘ Oxford University Press/Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford. 
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World Bank recommended Brazil, Colombia and Ukraine, countries with very 
different needs and which had little in common with the UK, to engage Coopers & 
Lybrand to advise on a new structure for their electricity industries. In all cases, they 
recommended a model that was almost indistinguishable from the still-unproven 
model introduced in the UK. 
By 2004, the World Bank had to acknowledge the problems with the British Model 
but continues to press for privatisation. The reforms in the UK had diverged so far 
from the desired model that the structure had become a mockery of what was intended 
(Thomas, 2006a). Wholesale markets had minimal liquidity because government had 
allowed integration of generation and retail. This meant that most power was bought 
and sold through ‗self-dealing‘ or confidential long-term contracts. Retail competition 
strongly favoured industrial consumers who could use their muscle and expertise to 
negotiate far better deals than residential consumers. The government had allowed 
take-overs and mergers leaving the structure dangerously close to an oligopoly. The 
high barriers to entry that this concentration and the integration of generation and 
retail imposed meant that market solutions to this concentration were implausible. 
On the World Bank, Thomas (2006b) found: 
The World Bank has finally begun to admit its ‗one-size-fits-all‘ policy of privatisation 
and liberalisation of electricity industries is not the perfect solution it was claimed to be. In 
June 2004, the World Bank‘s chief economist, Francois Bourguignon, admitted ‗there was 
probably some ‗irrational exuberance‘ in recent years on the potential benefits of 
privatization‘. The President, James Wolfensohn, also said that ‗the Washington 
Consensus [the 1989 international agreement that paved the way for privatisation and 
liberalisation of utility industries] has been dead for years‘. 
Thomas (2006b) identified three factors why the British Model not only had not 
worked, but never could work: 
 Companies need a regulatory bargain to deal with the risks inherent in the electricity 
industry. In a sector like electricity, dominated by capital costs, long lead-times and 
with a standard product, companies cannot rely on market forces to provide a reliable 
rate of return. No bank will finance the investment of a billion dollars in a power 
station without strong contractual assurances on the volume and price of the power 
they sell; 
 Competition is not a free lunch. Much of policy seems to be driven by a belief that 
competition is the economists‘ mythical ‗free lunch‘. For many products, the costs of 
competition may indeed be low compared to the benefits of having a field of suppliers 
competing to survive to supply a product, but for electricity the balance is very 
different. Costs of competition are various and often very high. Perhaps the clearest 
cost is the risk premium on investment. Other costs include the software needed to set 
up and operate markets. These systems have cost British consumers several billion 
Euro and continue to impose heavy costs because of their running costs and the need 
to frequently adapt and update them 
 Electricity is different from other commodities. These differences mean that the 
characteristics that allow other commodities markets to function do not apply to 
electricity. They include: inability to store power; need for supply and demand to 
match at all times; lack of substitutes; vital role in modern society; electricity is a 
standard product; and environmental impacts. 
From a practical point of view, the field of electricity companies willing to invest 
outside their home market, especially for the non-network parts of the business, had 
largely collapsed. The only exception has been Europe, where the ‗Seven Brothers‘, 
the large companies that have increasingly come to dominate the European electricity 
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market, have continued to expand (Thomas, 2003). The ‗Seven Brothers‘ are EDF and 
Suez/Electrabel from France, E.ON and RWE from Germany, ENEL from Italy, 
Iberdrola from Spain and Vattenfall from Sweden. It is no coincidence that these 
companies are prominent in the list of expected bidders for the Turkish distribution 
companies. 
Despite these acknowledged failures, the World Bank and IMF are still making loans 
contingent on privatisation policies. 
4.1.2 World Bank Projects for the Turkish electricity sector 
Electricity Generation Rehabilitation and Restructuring Project 
According to the World Bank
4
, Electricity Generation Rehabilitation and 
Restructuring Project for Turkey ‗will improve supply security during the reform 
transition and restructure the state-owned generation business into corporatized 
entities.‘ The project components are:  
 rehabilitation of Afsin-Elbistan A Power Plant. The Afsin Elbistan generation 
complex which includes Afsin Elbistan A and the newly commissioned Afsin 
Elbistan B, is the largest thermal generation complex in Turkey.  
 component 2 will focus on supporting Electricity Generation Corporation 
(EÜAS) in restructuring its generation business into financially and 
operationally viable portfolio generation companies and a hydro corporation. 
This work will create the basis for undertaking the future privatization of these 
generation entities. 
 
 Electricity Distribution Rehabilitation Project 
According to the World Bank
5
, the objective of the Electricity Distribution 
Rehabilitation Project of Turkey is to help improve the reliability of power supply to 
consumers in Turkey by supporting the implementation of the electricity distribution 
network rehabilitation and expansion program. The Project has two components: 
 Distribution Network Rehabilitation and Expansion which includes investment 
projects for distribution network rehabilitation and expansion in the Turkish 
Electricity Distribution Corporation (TEDAS) regional companies of Ayedav, 
Uludag, Meram, Gediz, Toroslar, Menderes, Osmangazi and Akdeniz. The 
investment components financed by the Loan include rehabilitation and 
upgrading of medium and low voltage distribution equipment and facilities, 
by: (i) replacing existing run-down and aged medium and low voltage 
overhead lines in densely populated areas with underground cables; and (ii) 
constructing new distribution substations and feeders; and 
 Technical Assistance for supervision consultants which will also finance 
supervision consultants to assist TEDAS and the regional companies in 
managing and supervising the implementation of the investment projects. 
These consultants will support TEDAS and regional staff in the following: a) 
provide monitoring support to the regional companies for the implementation 
                                                 
4 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941
&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P085561  
5 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941
&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P096801  
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of the investments; b) ensure that the project activities are well coordinated 
between the TEDAS, regional companies and the contractors as will as with 
other relevant agencies; and c) ensure that the supplied equipment and civil 
and installation works are in compliance with the Project design and work 
schedule. 
 
4.2 The European Union 
The European Union has been trying to impose reforms on national electricity 
industries for nearly 20 years under a policy of trying to create a ‗single European 
electricity market‘ (Thomas, 2005, 2006c, 2007a). The policy was vague and muddled 
until the mid-90s but, as with the World Bank, it was the British Model that provided 
a structure to emulate. The rhetoric of the changes has been strongly oriented towards 
creating competition. However, as with the World Bank, the motives for its policy 
seem to go beyond this pro-competition agenda. Other motives appear to be: 
 A political agenda to wrest control over national electricity industries from 
national governments and put it in the hands of the European Commission; 
 A dislike and distrust of nationally-owned companies because of their power; 
 To create European companies that are strong enough to prevent entry by non-
EU-based companies and can be an important presence in World markets. 
The Council of Ministers adopted a Directive concerning common rules of the 
internal market in electricity in December 1996, 96/92/EC. Opposition to 
liberalisation and competition from the electricity industry and from some 
governments was placated by the introduction of a range of options, for example on 
access to networks, which appeared to allow the large utilities, the ‗national 
champions‘, to continue to dominate their national systems. However, these less 
liberal options were not widely adopted and in 2003, the first Directive was 
superseded by Directive 2003/54/EC of June 2003, in which these less liberal options 
were removed. 
While the Directives are complex and place numerous requirements on Member 
States, at their heart is an objective to transform the electricity industry from a 
monopoly basis to one operated on competitive principles by making wholesale and 
retail competitive markets. 
The 2003 Directives acknowledged there was a risk that relying on market signals 
might not be enough to ensure there was sufficient generating capacity. Paragraph 23 
of the preamble of both Directives states: 
‗In the interest of security of supply, the supply/demand balance in individual Member States 
should be monitored, and monitoring should be followed by a report on the situation at Community 
level, taking account of interconnection capacity between areas. Such monitoring should be carried 
out sufficiently early to enable appropriate measures to be taken if security of supply is 
compromised.‘ 
Article 22 of the Electricity Directive states: 
‗However, Member States should ensure the possibility to contribute to security of supply through 
the launching of a tendering procedure or an equivalent procedure in the event that sufficient 
electricity generation capacity is not built on the basis of the authorisation procedure.‘ 
So the Commission does not have enough faith in markets to allow them to work. 
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The Commission acknowledges that the objectives of creating a single market in 
electricity are far from being achieved (Thomas, 2005). In September 2006, the 
Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes stated
6
: 
‗It is clear that no-one in their right mind could say that a competitive single European energy 
market is already in place today.‘ 
While the President of the Commission, Manuel Barroso said in September 2006
7
: 
‗In energy terms I can tell you that I am more convinced than ever that we need new legislation 
concerning regulation. What we know is that the status quo isn't working. What we have to do is 
decide how we can most effectively reform the system to the benefit of business and consumers‘ 
On energy prices, the Commission is also acknowledging, for the first time, that the 
Directives are not producing the desired results
8
: 
‗Liberalisation has clearly led to some efficiency improvements in energy supply and delivered 
savings to customers, particularly in the initial phase. However, recent increases in wholesale 
electricity and gas prices have, to a greater or lesser extent, fed through into the bills of end-users 
and now offset some of the earlier reductions, particularly for the very largest industrial energy 
users. It would therefore appear that efficiency improvements are not being passed on to consumers 
quickly enough. It is highly questionable that gas and electricity prices are the result of a truly 
competitive process rather than being the direct result of decision of companies with market power.‘ 
The sector has seen very strong corporate concentration leaving much of Europe in 
the hands of an oligopoly of the large international companies, the ‗Seven Brothers‘. 
The EU has done nothing to prevent this. Wholesale markets lack liquidity and are not 
reliable places to buy and sell power, much less do prices provide price signals for 
new investment. Retail competition for residential consumers has either been 
ineffective, with few consumers exercising the right to switch, or, as in the UK, most 
consumers that switch fail to identify the cheapest supplier. 
The Directives were under review from the start of 2006, as required in the 2003 
Directive. However, instead of trying to tackle the fundamental problems that have 
emerged, on corporate concentration, integration of generation and retail and lack of 
competitive wholesale or retail markets, the Commission is concentrating on measures 
that are hardly central to the overt objectives of the Directive. In particular, it is 
pressing for a new Directive that will require full ownership unbundling of networks, 
greater powers for regulators and more control over the electricity industry at 
Commission level (Thomas, 2007b). More complete unbundling and stricter 
regulation should be no more than enabling measures for competition to take place. 
From a broader perspective, an important priority for energy industries is dealing with 
the threat of climate change. The European Union (EU) headlines its energy policy, an 
‗integrated climate and energy policy‘, implying that policy has been developed to 
simultaneously satisfy the objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
maximising economic efficiency. Blatantly, this is not what has happened in the EU. 
Policy has been derived with the objective of economic efficiency only in mind with 
climate change measures grafted on at the end. This will only be an efficient way to 
                                                 
6 N Kroes (2006) ‗The need for a renewed European energy policy‘ Speech to OFGEM seminar on 
Powering the Energy Debate: Europe - Competition and Regulation. 28 September 2006 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/541&format=HTML&aged=1&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
7 Financial Times, 12 September 2006, p 12. 
8 European Commission (2007) ‗Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market‘ {SEC(2007) 12}, 
Brussels,  
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meet the twin objectives if competition/liberalisation measures are, at worst, neutral to 
meeting climate change objectives. 
This is clearly not the case. In a monopoly market, generators can be instructed 
(‗command and control‘ policies) as to what technologies to deploy and measures can 
be taken to ensure that the profits of retailers are not dependent on how much power 
they sell. This means they have no incentive to sell more electricity. Retailers can be 
used as a vehicle for implementing energy efficiency measures through ‗least cost 
planning‘ policies. These are based on the assumption that consumers want an energy 
service, not kWh per se. It may be cheaper to buy energy efficient equipment and pay 
a small amount extra per kWh than to meet the demand that would have arisen if 
energy efficiency measures had not been undertaken. 
All the evidence suggests if companies are left to choose, they will buy fossil fuel 
plant and they are highly unlikely to choose low carbon sources such as renewables 
and nuclear power. With a field of competing retailers, companies will make more 
money the more power they sell, and implementing energy efficiency measures with a 
consumer who could opt to switch retailer at short notice would make no commercial 
sense. So, meeting environmental objectives can only be at the expense of 
compromising competition. The ‗market-based‘ mechanisms, such as a the EU‘s 
carbon trading scheme, are a poor substitute for a real market and companies 
generally find ways to exploit these mechanisms for their own advantage rather than 
meeting the explicit objective. 
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5 Brazil and the Nordic market 
5.1 Brazil 
Brazil is large country in terms of population (190,000) and geographical size (8.5m 
km
2
). In 2004, installed electricity generation capacity was more than 80GW and 
electricity demand was about 350TWh and, about 90% of which was produced from 
hydro-electric sources. Typically, demand grew at 6% per year throughout the 1990s. 
Brazil began liberalisation of its electricity industry under pressure from the World 
Bank in 1995 and by 2000, most of the distribution companies (previously most of 
which were owned by state governments) had been sold to US, Brazilian and 
European companies. The government was not able to privatise the generation sector 
(mostly owned by subsidiaries of the Federal holding company, Eletrobras). There 
was no investment in new generating capacity because Eletrobras was not allowed to 
invest and foreign investors were unwilling to invest. The inevitable crisis happened 
in 2000 and required that demand be cut by 25% to prevent blackouts. This was 
achieved due to remarkable conservation efforts by the public. Lula abandoned 
privatisation, many of the foreign owners of the distribution companies withdrew in 
various states of disarray and a new way to stimulate new generating capacity was 
introduced based largely on the Single Buyer model. Brazil negotiated higher limits 
on public spending for infrastructure investment and this allowed Eletrobras to make a 
significant contribution to the investment needs. 
This seems to be the situation in Turkey. Turkey does have the possibility to remain 
dominated by public ownership since distribution has not yet been privatised and a 
large share of generation assets is still under the control of a single dominant public 
enterprise. The difference is in the level of the primary surplus which in Turkey is 
6.5% and in Brazil 4.3% for 2006 and 2007. So if there is political will Turkey can 
follow Brazil‘s example. 
Brazil‘s hydro-electric stations are a unique resource, typically with 2-3 years of water 
stored. In a market, this makes it difficult to stimulate thermal plant because in a wet 
year, the demand for power from thermal plants will be much lower than in a dry 
year, so a series of wet years would be likely to bankrupt thermal power plant owners. 
5.2 The Nordic Market 
A single electricity market covering the whole of the Nordic region was progressively 
created starting with Norway (1991) and incorporating Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
from 1996 onwards. Each of the four countries‘ systems is roughly comparable in 
size. It is based on the stored hydro-electric capacity in Norway (100% hydro) and 
balanced in dry years by increased thermal power contributions from the other 
countries in dry years. 
The wholesale market is the only wholesale market in Europe that is adequately liquid 
and retail consumers do switch reasonably often in Norway and to a lesser extent 
Sweden. But there has been little investment in new generation since liberalisation 
and most of this is subsidised renewables not competing in the market. In 2002, a dry 
winter led to the wholesale price of electricity increasing by a factor of 6. Electric-
intensive consumers in Norway were not exposed to this because in 1991, the 
government signed long-term contracts for power supply with them that took them out 
of the market for 15-20 years. In 2006, a dry period again led to a six-fold increase in 
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power prices but a very wet autumn saved the situation. However, it seems a matter of 
time before the Nordic system hits a major crisis. The system is dominated by four 
‗national champion‘ companies Vattenfall (Sweden), Statkraft (Norway), DONG 
(Denmark) and Fortum (Finland). All four companies are wholly owned by central 
government (except Fortum, Finland, which is 60% government owned). Much of the 
rest of the system is owned by companies owned by local authorities. 
It is an irony that, arguably the most successful electricity liberalisation programme in 
the world, albeit its ability to stimulate investment is still unproven, took place in a 
system dominated by public ownership. 
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6 Options for Turkey 
The British Model was designed for a mature system with limited demand growth. 
Most analysts of electricity reforms acknowledge that a wholesale market to work 
well, there must be a surplus of generating capacity and an oversize transmission 
system to prevent gaming by generators. These are conditions that do not exist in 
Turkey and substantial investment in generating capacity and the network would have 
to be undertaken. If this could be done under the current ownership structure, it begs 
two questions: if the investment needs can be fulfilled under the current structure, 
what is the point of privatising and liberalising; and will investment be self-sustaining 
under the new structure or will the government have to step in again to provide new 
capacity to meet growing demand, because in a competitive market, major 
investments are too risky. 
Retail competition is especially problematic for small consumers who do not have the 
resources, skills or incentive to negotiate as hard for power, as, say, an aluminium 
smelter. It is hard to see how retail competition could work where there are a 
significant number of poor consumers that find it difficult to pay their bills. Part 
opening the market is especially dangerous, unless the regulator is vigilant prepared to 
take steps to protect small consumers, as companies will give low prices to consumers 
that can choose and high prices to captive consumers. In the UK, the retail market was 
part open from 1990-98 with small consumers still captive to their local retail 
company. It became clear in 1998 that the price reductions received by large 
consumers were largely at the expense of small consumers. The Regulator published 
data showing that retailers were systematically allocating their expensive wholesale 
purchases to the captive market and their cheap purchases to the competitive market 
(Thomas, 2006a). 
The British Model in anything like its pure form is therefore neither suitable for 
Turkey nor is it achievable. The compromised versions that could be introduced, for 
example with limited wholesale and retail competition and a concentrated corporate 
structure are unlikely to be preferable to the existing structure. 
6.1 The World Bank 
The World Bank‘s priority, judged on its actions if not its words, is privatisation and 
foreign ownership, not competition. However, it is on weak ground partly because of 
the high general level of dissatisfaction with what are seen as policies that are for the 
benefit of the West and Western companies. Specifically in the electricity sector, the 
acknowledged failure of its policies over the past two decades puts the onus on the 
World Bank to explain how its policies on electricity will work in Turkey when they 
have already failed in Turkey with the IPPs and elsewhere with the British Model. 
As Brazil has demonstrated, a strong, influential country can force the World Bank to 
retreat on its demands for privatisation and on public spending limits. 
6.2 The European Commission 
The position with the European Commission is more problematic. Unless the main 
members of the Union, especially France and Germany, force the withdrawal of the 
Directive, the Commission has invested so much of its credibility in its electricity 
liberalisation measures that it will never acknowledge they have failed no matter how 
far the model is compromised keeping the electricity industry viable. For other new 
members, the advantages of joining the EU were seen to be so overwhelming that the 
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countries complied with the EU‘s demands largely without question. Thus, Malta 
signed up for the Electricity Directive despite the fact that it only has one power 
station, making the cope for competition negligible. 
Turkey is in a stronger position than most of the recent accession states and if Turkey 
decides its overall interest is best served by joining the EU, it should recognise the 
strength of its position. It not only provides a large new market for existing EU 
members, it strengthens a major new route for gas supplies to Western Europe from 
the Middle East. This can be used to lever concessions on energy markets. In theory, 
the Commission has no jurisdiction over the ownership of companies and Turkey can 
choose to maintain much of the electricity sector in public ownership without 
contravening EU legislation. In practice, it implicitly endorses privatisation, for 
example, in its 2006 report on Turkey‘s accession negotiations9, the EU noted that: 
‗Turkey had progressed well in terms of macroeconomic stability and privatisation.‘ 
This was compared to the situation in 2004, when the Commission found: ‗The 2004 
report nevertheless noted that progress on privatisation had remained rather limited.‘  
Maintaining EÜAS, TEIAS and TETAS in the public sector should not therefore 
mean that Turkey would break EU regulations on the electricity sector, although the 
Commission clearly has its own pro-privatisation agenda albeit with no political 
mandate for this. 
Where concessions might be needed is on retail competition for small consumers. 
This makes little sense in mature markets but makes no sense in a country like Turkey 
where many consumers use only small amounts of power and where the prospects of 
producing a competitive field of suppliers in any but the richest regions are minimal. 
A well regulated monopoly, which did not allow suppliers to use small consumers to 
cross-subsidise industrial consumers (as happened in the UK) would be a much more 
sensible solution. 
Unbundling is the other problematic area. For transmission, the sector in Turkey is 
already unbundled in TEIAS. Unless the Commission chooses to take the perverse 
position that under its unbundling rules, the state cannot own a generation and a 
network company, no action would be needed there. However, for distribution, 
especially if the 21 regional companies are created from TEDAS, further dividing 
them into network and retail companies, especially if retail competition was not 
introduced for residential consumers, would be a costly and pointless exercise. 
However, ownership unbundling is being strongly resisted in the rest of the EU and 
may not be imposed. 
The main issue is therefore investment in new capacity. Article 22 of the 2003 
Electricity Directive states: 
‗However, Member States should ensure the possibility to contribute to security of supply through 
the launching of a tendering procedure or an equivalent procedure in the event that sufficient 
electricity generation capacity is not built on the basis of the authorisation procedure.‘ 
If, as is likely, not enough new generating capacity is built, Turkey would therefore be 
allowed, perhaps via TETAS, to commission the construction of new plants via 
competitive tender, a process that EÜAS would be well placed to win. 
                                                 
9 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e01113.htm  
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7 Conclusions 
After 15 years of efforts in Turkey to privatise and open up the electricity sector to 
competition, there is little positive to show for these efforts. No companies have been 
privatised and there is no significant competition in either the wholesale or retail parts 
of the electricity sector. Private sector generators have been introduced through the 
TOR, BOT and BOO provisions, but far from contributing to competition, these have 
provided power that is inflexible and often expensive. The Power Purchase 
Agreements mean these plants have to be operated even when cheaper capacity is 
available from the publicly owned plants operated by EÜAS. Large amounts of 
money have been spent reorganising and splitting up the previous integrated 
company, TEK, with few clear benefits to counterbalance the costs incurred. Large 
amounts of money have also been wasted as fees to consultants on abortive attempts 
to privatise the companies. 
The World Bank is morally and intellectually bankrupt in the electricity sector. 
Worldwide, its policies over the past two decades have failed with the costs being 
borne by the electricity consumers of the recipients of their loans. Morally, its policy 
of making its loans conditional on the recipient government privatising its industries 
appears morally wrong. Whilst it is understandable that a bank would seek to impose 
conditions to safeguard its loans, the ownership of key national industries should 
rightly be decided only be democratically elected bodies, not an unelected financial 
institution. Given the failure of its prescribed policies, the World Bank should be 
circumspect in imposing such policies, at least until its policies have a rather better 
track record of success. 
While the main explicit driving force of the World Bank‘s policy has been 
privatisation, the main explicit driving force of the European Commission‘s policy 
has been creation of competition. However, the World Bank and The European 
Commission must be judged on their actions, not their words. As with the World 
Bank, the European Commission has a rather wider agenda including privatisation, 
growth of European transnational energy companies and taking control of the energy 
away from national governments. The policy has been no more successful than that of 
the World Bank in its fundamental intellectual justification of transforming the 
electricity industry from a monopoly industry to one run as a competitive market. 
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